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Scholarly criticism of judicial decision-making has been abundant
and wide-ranging over the past ten years. It has included charges of
judicial usurpation and complaints about the quality of judicial
opinions. It has brought the objectivity of the courts into question.
While the Supreme Court has attracted the largest volume of criticism,
state courts,2 and even lower federal courts,3 have been embroiled in
similar controversy. But scholars have found it easier to detect errors
than to suggest alternative courses of action. Professor Henry Hart, for
example, was unable to do much more than remind the legal profes-
sion that "reason is the life of the law." 4 Similarly, Professor Wechsler
has urged a search for "neutral principles" for the adjudication of con-
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1. For a cross-section of what is generally considered responsible criticism of the Su-
preme Court, see, e.g., Bickel 8- Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAgv. L. REv. 1, 1-6 (1957); Kurland, Forward: "Equal in
Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Gorernment,"
The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 H.ARV. L. Rav. 143 (1964); Lewis, Consumer Picketing
and the Court-the Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 MNN. L REy. 479 (1965); Cf.
Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73
HARv. L. Rav. 84 (1959). One need not subscribe to Professor Kurland's method of pre-
sentation in order to agree with many of his criticisms. For a recent example of what
Kurland would probably consider the misuse of the per curiam decision, see Cameron v.
Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965). Another distressing practice of the Court is the frequent
treatment of counsel's statements in oral argument as facts proved by competent evidence
at trial and, therefore, as a proper basis for decision. See Justice White's critical comments
on the practice in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 592-93 (1965).
For what most observers would call less responsible criticism of the Court, see
J. KInmPATlcK, THE SOVMERIGN STATES (1957); A. Scorr, TirE Suram m CouRT v. Tir Co.%-
sTITUTION (1963).
2. See, e-g., Peck, Judicial Creativity and State Labor Law, 40 WAsit. L. Rav. 743 (195);
Smith, The Current Opinions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas: A Study in Craftsman-
ship, 1 ARK. L. REv. 89 (1947); cf. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions.
61 CoLtmr. L. REv. 810 (1961); Note, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and Section 339
of the Restatement of Torts: A Case Study of Opinion-Writing, 113 U. PA. L REy. 563
(1965).
Although written criticism of the state courts is not as plentiful as that regarding the
Supreme Court, the late Karl Llewellyn, in 1960, noted what he called "a crisis in con-
fidence" about these courts "which packs danger." K. LtEEwrtXN, TitE Co!taoN Law
TRADrMON: DECIDING APPEALs 3 (1960).
3. See Corker, Lampadephoria, The Integrity of the Printed Judicial Decision, 42 WAst.
L. REv. 1065 (1967).
4. Hart, supra note 1, at 125. In H. HART & A. SAcrs, Tim LEGxAL Pocass 588 (tent.
ed. 1958), the suggestion is made that the degree of reason in a court's decision is mea-
sured by the "respect accorded" the decision by future judges and by how long the deci-
sion remains unoverruled. Unfortunately, the point is not developed any further, although
there is an intimation that the ability of a decision to withstand "professional criticism"
may also be a criterion of whether it is well-reasoned. For comments on Professor Hart's
references to "reasoned" decisions, see J. STONE, LEGAL S,sTEM AND LAWYEiR'S RE soxtNas
317-19 (1964); J. STONE, SOCIAL Ds t. sONs oF LAw AND JusTicE 656-57, 670-72, 678-80 (1966).
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stitutional issues. 5 Not surprisingly, both were met with demands
that they give "valid examples of what they consider to be judicial
reference to neutrality or impersonality of principle." It was even un-
fairly suggested that what Professor Hart would have called a reasoned
decision is simply one with which he would have agreed.7
Much of the scholarly debate has focused specifically on Professor
Wechsler's call for the discovery of "neutral principles." Wechsler was
met initially with the obvious objection that by definition principles,
including principles of adjudication, cannot be neutral., Professor
Deutsch has gone beyond this logical criticism and more accurately
characterized the demand for neutral principles as the "hopeless" call
for principles that can and will be generally applied and that are, at
the same time, publicly acceptableY Deutsch points out, however, that
even this reformulation is subject to attack. The general applicability
of a principle would not be sufficient to establish its "neutrality" for
Wechsler, since he would certainly reject any such principle as, for
example, that Negroes should always win (or lose) cases.10 If the funda-
mental test of the neutrality of a principle lies in its public acceptabil-
ity, on the other hand, the point of Professor Wechsler's criticism is
lost, because Wechsler would require, in addition to acceptability it-
self, criteria of acceptability to which men of good-faith might sub-
scribe despite differences in their personal values. For Wechsler, to say
that a principle is publicly acceptable cannot be to say only that the
public accepts it.
Faced with these discouraging and inconclusive results, one might
abandon the attempt to show that the process of adjudication can be
impersonal or neutral. One might recognize, for example, that all legal
activity, whether or not concerned with constitutional issues, is goal-
oriented, and that it would be more productive to specify particular
goals and work toward them. 1 However, most legal scholars have been
5. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
6. Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. 0ill.
L. RiEv. 661, 672 (1960).
7. Henson, A Criticism of Criticism: In Re Meaning, 29 FOanDAm L. REv. 553, 557-58
(1961); cf. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1302-06 (1960).
8. See Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
35 (1963); cf. Miller & Howell, supra note 6. See also Henkin, Some Reflections on Current
Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 637, 652 (1961); Pollak, Racial Discrimina-
tion and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
9. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 195, 197, 216 (1968). Deutsch's article con-
tains further citations to the discussion generated by Wechsler, supra note 5.
10. Deutsch, supra note 9, at 190-195.
11. This is somewhat the approach taken by Professor Black, who sees the elimination
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unwilling to adopt a goal-oriented point of view. They have felt that
if a system of decision-making is to be called a legal system, it must
make it possible for people who disagree strongly over the merits of a
decision to agree nevertheless that the case was properly decided, or,
if this is impossible, at least to agree that the decision was adequately
justified. Although it is generally accepted that the law does in fact
meet this requirement, scholars have been unable to show how and
why it is met or even to prove that it is met at all. This article will
attempt to explain this inability by examining the conditions which
judicial decision-making must fulfill in order to meet the minimal
standard of objectivity.
12
I. Traditional Theories of Legal Reasoning
A. Law as a Set of Rules
Scholars attempting to identify an objective method of legal reason-
ing have typically assumed that the law consists of rules. When they
have been unable to account for actual decisions solely in terms of
rules, they have enlarged their description of the law to include more
general rule-like statements called principles and still broader proposi-
tions called standards.' 3 It has been recognized, however, that if ob-
jectivity in legal reasoning exists because legal reasoning consists of
reasoning from rules, then legal rules must theoretically be capable of
complete statement, although as a practical matter such completeness
may be difficult to attain.14 Furthermore, once the rule has been corn-
of racism from our society as the most important present function of the legal system and
who asserts that the nice distinctions upon which the traditional notions of the scope of
the judicial function are based cannot be permitted to impede this process. Black, Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HAnv. L. R v. 69, 105 (1967). See also id. 82.
12. In the parlance of contemporary philosophy, the proposed model is an explication
of the concept of legal reasoning. As an explication, the model is prescriptive because, in
exploring the concept, it attempts to stipulate what legal reasoning would have to be in
order to meet the demands of objectivity made upon it. Yet it is also descriptive because
it is partially based on what actually occurs in the legal process. On the subject of explica-
tion, see Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, 2 Ix1--mn-
NATIONAL ENCYcLOPEDIA OF UNnrIED SCIENCE No. 7, at 11-12 (1952).
13. An example of a legal "principle" is that no one should be liable to pay damages
in a tort action in the absence of a showing of fault. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Deci-
sion, 36 H~av. L. Rnv. 641, 645-46 (1923). The proposition that fault is present when one
fails to behave as would an ordinary prudent man exemplifies a "standard." Id. See also
R. POUND, AN INTRODUcTION TO TIE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 56-58 (19.22); Dworkin, The Model
of Rules, 35 U. CaL L REv. 14, 22-31 (1967).
14. See Dworkin, supra note 13, at 25-26. Professor Dworkin postulates that legal rules
are capable of complete statement in order to contend that in fact judges do not have
discretion in any non-trivial sense in the application of the law. To avoid the only prob-
lem that he recognizes-that of controlling the judge's power to change the law-he con-
tends that there exist "principles" which are themselves part of the law and which control
1313
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pletely stated, it must be possible to ascertain from the formulation
itself the factual situations to which the rule applies.'0 Unless this can
be done, one is obliged to admit that judges have a large measure of
discretion in applying legal rules 6 and to conclude that the assumption
that the law consists of general rules precludes any possibility of ob-
jective decision-making. But experienced lawyers would agree that it
is counter-intuitive to contend that so-called rules of law can be com-
pletely stated and that it is still more implausible to maintain that the
statement of a rule can completely indicate the situations to which it
is applicable. This problem has been explored at length elsewhere.' 7
In the remainder of this article, it will be assumed that legal rules
cannot be completely stated and that one can never be certain of
exactly when a so-called rule of law is applicable.'8
It is not surprising that legal rules are unable to fulfill such stringent
requirements. If legal rules were complete and self-applying, their ap-
plication by the courts would be largely a deductive process, which it
clearly is not. To put the matter another way, it is precisely because
legal reasoning is not primarily deductive that one is unable to state a
legal rule completely or to ascertain from the statement of the rule
when it is applicable. As a simple illustration, consider whether a
statute requiring "motor vehicles" to pay a road tax is applicable to
go-karts. 19 Only if the statute had defined "motor vehicle" to include
the judges' creation of new rules and their abolition of old ones. See id. 39-40. Professor
Dworkin first announced this interesting thesis in Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 1. PIUL.
624 (1963). Cf. MacCollum, Dworkin on Judicial Discretion, 60 PIL. 638 (1963). In Cfhristie,
The Model of Principles, 1968 DurE L.J. 649, I have criticized Dworkin's division of the
legal universe into rules and principles.
15. Dworkin, supra note 13, at 25.
16. Cf. note 14 supra.
17. Christie, supra note 14.
18. Even the Restatement's formulation of the Rule in Shelley's Case specifically dis-
claims completeness. Cf. id. 657. The difficulty of adequately formulating legal "rules" I
acknowledged as a factor that seriously limited the benefits to be obtained from applying
the techniques of modern logic to legal analysis. Cf. Allen & Caldwell, Modern Logic 6'
Judicial Decision Making: A Sketch of One View, 28 L. & C.P. 213, 226-34 (1963);
Cullison, Logical Analysis of Legal Doctrine: The Normative Structure of Positive Law, 53
IOWA L. R~v. 1209, 1262-68 (1968).
19. The example is suggested by Bums v. Currell, (1963J 2 Q.B. 433, where the de-
fendant was prosecuted for operating a go-kart without liability insurance. The question
was whether a go-kart was "a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use
of roads." In earlier cases, "dumpers" used for construction work had been held to be
outside the scope of the statute, whereas a farm tractor had been held to be within It.
Lord Chief Justice Parker thought the test was "whether a reasonable person looking at
the vehicle would say that one of its users would be a road user." Id. at 440. He decided
that the go-kart was analogous to the "dumpers" and quashed the conviction. Cf. Mclloyle
v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931), which held that an airplane was outside the scope of
a statute prohibiting the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce.
"Motor vehicle" was defined as an "automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon,
motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails."
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go-karts would the decision be primarily deductive; if there were such
a statutory definition, moreover, the case would probably never be
litigated. Without such a definition, the decision cannot be deduced
until the court has supplied a minor premise by deciding whether a
go-kart is a motor vehicle for the purposes of the statute. Consider, as
another example, the statute prohibiting the transportation of women
in interstate commerce for prostitution, debauchery, or any other im-
moral purpose.20 Suppose a man transports a woman from one state to
another where she undresses in a motel room and cavorts in the nude
before her escort and a male photographer who takes obscene photo-
graphs.21 Here also, deduction only enters the situation in a very minor
way. The major question is whether these actions constitute transporta-
tion for an "immoral purpose" within the meaning of the statute. If
the purpose is found to be immoral, a simple logical operation will
determine that the statute has been violated and that the prescribed
penalties should be applied. But this second or logical part of the prob-
lem is relatively trivial.22 These examples illustrate that the twvo aspects
of the problem-the substantive or classificatory aspect,3 and the logi-
cal one2 --seldom, if ever, merge.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1964).
21. This example is suggested by United States v. Mathison, 239 F.2d 38 (7th Cir.
1956). The activities were held not to be "immoral" within the Mann ACL
22. For a discussion of the minor role of deduction in legal argument see 0. JrEnsDz,
THE NAat OF LEGAL ARGuiENT 7-31 (1957); J. STo E, LEGAL SysrEt AND LIwYEWS
REAsoanjNs 293-300 (1964); Guest, Logic in the Law, in O.orD Esws i.n Junts
PRUDENC E 176 (A. Guest ed. 1961).
23. The insignificance of deduction noted supra note 22 is often reflected in the cases.
In Alder v. George, [1964] 2 Q.B. 7, the question whether a statute prohibiting certain
activities "in the vicinity of" a particular place applied to activity within the place was
carried on appeal to the level of the divisional court of the Queen's Bendi. See also,
People v. Soto, 49 Cal. 67 (1874), holding that a man who had stolen a heifer could be
prosecuted under a statute making it a crime to steal a cow; Gill v. M'Dowell, [1903] 2
Ir. R. 463 (K.B.), where the question arose whether a plaintiff, intending to buy two
heifers and a bullock or two bullocks and a heifer, could recover for breach of warranty
or for deceit when in fact he was sold a bullock, a heifer, and a hermaphrodite. (Tie
court ruled that the plaintiff had a cause of action.)
In the days when solutions to conflict of laws problems depended primarily on
questions of "personal status," "domicile," "contract," or "substantive" and "pro-
cedural" law, a substantial body of literature developed around the proper use of thee
conceptual categories, which were anything but self-applying. See, e.g., Cook, "Characteriza-
tion" in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YA.E .J. 191 (1941); Robertson, A Survey of the Charac-
terization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 52 HAM. L. REv. 747 (1939).
24. Nor are the most important elements of legal reasoning accounted for by
induction, the second branch of dassical logic. In its most usual sense, induction refers
to the process of inferring from known facts the existence of unknown facts, an inference
often expressed in terms of a rule-like general statement which can serve as the starting
point of deductive reasoning and which can be verified or refuted by future observation.
But no sophisticated observer any longer believes that law consists of preexisting rules
which men somehow discover. The application of the law is alwa)s at least partially a
creative process. Even if one were to suppose that inductive arguments are as sound and
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Because identifiable "rules," "principles" and "standards" do not
exist, any theory of legal reasoning that requires them is necessarily in-
complete. If one asks himself what so-called rules of law are, he will be
obliged to conclude that they are constructs formed by scholars writing
books and articles, by lawyers litigating cases, and by judges preparing
to decide cases. As such they serve a very useful purpose. They are,
first of all, a helpful mnemonic device for classifying large numbers
of cases. They provide a concise shorthand for referring to matters
which, at any particular moment, are not in issue.
25 As general state-
ments of our expectations and preferences, they also provide a means
of predicting the outcomes of future cases and for arguing about the
desirability of those outcomes. Yet the position that rules are the actual
content of the law, rather than a means of understanding it, is un-
tenable because there are any number of so-called rules which logically
can be constructed out of any given number of cases, and there is no
authoritative statement of which is correct. Under traditional theory,
not even a court's express attempt to state the correct rule is authorita-
tive; it is only evidence of what the rule is, and sometimes not even the
best evidence.
If one took seriously the attempts of even the most prestigious courts
to state correct rules of law, he would be forced to conclude that half
the decided cases in England and America were decided improperly."
as compelling as deductive ones, legal decisions are no more compelled by induction
than by deduction.
If one seeks to justify induction by employing the techniques of deductive logic, then
the induction cannot be "logically" justified. See K. POPPER, Tin LOGIC or SCICENTIVIC
DiscovERY 27-31 (1959). It should be noted that even in mathematics induction con.
cerns discovery. The discoveries are not facts about the world of material objects, of
course, but about the system of mathematics being examined. See I. POLYA, MATIIEA'rIcs
AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING 3-8 (1954). If one is trying to predict what decisions courts will
make, rather than making those decisions himself, he may indeed be using inductive
methods. Though induction may be useful in this practical sense, it is not useful In
developing a theory of judicial decision-making.
25. See L. FULLER & R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CoNTRAcr LAi, 327-28 (1964). For other
sources recognizing the purely instrumental nature of legal "rules," see Cook, Sci'ntifw
Afethod and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303 (1927); Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, 13 U.
KAN. L. REv. 183 (1964). The point was put very well by a noted contemporary
philosopher:
Principles and laws may serve us well. They can help us to bring to bear on what
is now in question what is not now in question. They help us to connect one thing
with another and another. But at the bar of reason, always the final appeal is to
cases (emphasis supplied).
Wisdom. A Feature of WVittgenstein's Technique, in J. WISDOM, PARADOX AND DiscovERY 90,
102 (1965). The same point was made recently by the Supreme Court. "iT]he error made by
the Court of Appeals was precisely its reliance on formulas extracted from their contexts
rather than on pragmatic analysis." Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,
390 U.S. 104, 119, n.16 (1968) (Justice Harlan).
26. See, e.g., Le Lievre v. Gould, [18931 1 Q.B. (CA.), in which Lord Esher was
compelled to retreat from the principles delimiting the nature of liability for negligence
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Indeed, these attempts at generalization have left us with the unsolv-
able problem of distinguishing between the supposed holding of a
case, often expressed as a rule or rules of law, and what is merely
dictum. The English have taken this distinction more seriously than
the Americans, although they have often concentrated on formulating
the rule of a particular case rather than the rule of a series of cases.
They have nevertheless found even the search of the ratio decidendi of
individual cases to be the pursuit of a chimaera. The best minds in the
profession joined in the search but have disagreed even as to what was
being sought.27 Attempting to base their search on some notion of the
relevant facts of a case, they found that selecting the relevant facts was
no easier than determining the rule of law itself.28 Here again, a court's
statement that certain facts were relevant to its decision was not con-
clusive,29 and the difficulties of the search were compounded by the
possibility that later courts might say that the bar misunderstood the
ratio decidendi of any particular case. Hedley Byrne &, Co. v. Heller &
Partners, Ltd.30 revealed that the Court of Appeal and most of the bar
that he had ennundated in Heaven v. Pender, 11 QXJ.D. 503. 509 (C.A. 1883). Compare
Lord Atkin's famous statement concerning the extent of liability for negligence, in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A-C. 562, 580 (Scot.), with Commn'r for Raila)s v.
Quinlan, [1964] A.C. 1054 (P.C.), especially id. at 1070.
27. Compare Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 10 YAtX . 161(1930), reprinted in A. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND Co.T.1.V-IL.Lw (1931), with
Gooderson, Ratio Decidendi and Rules of Law, 30 CAN. B. REv. 892 (1952); cf. G. WILLmA-Is.
LEARNING = LAw 71-77 (7th ed. 1963). See Goodhart, The Ratio Deddendi of a
Case, 22 MOD. L. REv. 117 (1959). For a general review of the subject see J. STONE, LECAL
SysiTm AND LAiWYER's REASONINGS, supra note 4 at 267-280. See also K. Lr~nwr. ,N, Tum
BpRAmLE BUSH (1951); Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding
Precedent, in OxFoa EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE 148 (A. Guest ed. 1961). For an interesting
review of the subject by a philosopher, see Sartorius, The Doctrine of Precedent and the
Problem of Relevance, 53 ARcHcv FUR REcHrs--UND SocIALrni.osopzim 343 (1967). For a re-
jection of the view that there is only one ratio decidendi in a case and a reinterpretation
of ratio decidendi as an hypothesis whose verification is supplied by an examination of
hypothetical cases, see R. Stone, Logic and the Law: The Precedence of Precedents, 51
MINN. L. Rxv. 655, 659 n.21, 661 n.24 (1967).
28. The failure of the attempt to buttress the theory on some notion of the "relevant-'or "material" "facts" is discussed in detail in J. STONE, LEGAL SYsrMt AND LAwIVI-'s
PrEASONwNs 267-74 (1964).
29. Attempts to treat a particularly succinct and sensible judicial statement as a statute,
so that future development of the rule would be an interpretation of that statement, have
ended in failure. Cf. the treatment of Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866) in
London Graving Dock Ltd. v. Horton [1951] A.C. 737. Lord MacDcrmott declared:
The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of
of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules
of interpretation appropriate thereto.
Id. at 761. See also Lord Porter's speech, id. at 744, Lord Normand's speeds, id. at 751,
and the House of Lords' treatment of the "rule of construction derived from Shelmer's
Case," Gilb. 200 (1725), concerning the meaning of the word "money" in a will, in Perrin
v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399, 405.
30. [1964] A.C. 465 (1963). The case stated that liability for negligent mismpreentation
could lie even in the absence of the spedal relationships of attorney-client, trustee-
beneficiary, etc., and that Derry v. Peek, minfra note 31, merely held that an allegation of
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had been operating for seventy-five years under a mistaken view of the
ratio decidendi of Derry v. Peck.31 A concept of such mythical propor-
tions does little to bolster attempts to establish the objectivity of legal
reasoning by reference to the binding nature of legal precedent as
expressed in rules.
82
B. The Levi and Llewellyn Models
The theories proposed by several legal scholars may serve to illus-
trate the range of difficulties inherent in rule-oriented models of judi-
cial decision-making. In America, the most generally accepted theory
of the nature of legal reasoning is that of Edward Levi. Levi hy-
pothesized that the law consists of rules, however imprecise, derived
from previously-decided cases and existing statutes.
8 3 When new cases
arise, the courts must declare a rule which encompasses the relevant
statutes, the unoverruled past cases, and the new case. If the courts
cannot state such a rule, then some or all of the past cases must be
outright fraud had been inadequately proved rather than that an action 
for negligent
misrepresentation would not lie on the facts of that case.
81. [1889] A.C. 337. Among those who seem to have been confused was Lord Devlin, 
a
member of the panel that decided Hedley Byrne. See P. DEVLIN, LAW AND MoRALs 
15
(1961). In Hedley Byrne, the House of Lords declared that there was no warrant for 
this
misunderstanding after Lord Shaw's speech in Nocton v. Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932, 965.
Nocton came twenty-five years after Derry itself and twenty-one years 
after the ratio
decidendi of Derry was misunderstood in Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491. Whether
many eyes were opened in 1914 is another matter, however. The Court 
of Appeal felt
bound to follow Le Lievre in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 
K.B. 164.
Even Denning, L.J., who dissented in Candler, was unaware of the true state 
of affairs,
for he thought that while Derry did rule on the question of liability for negligent 
mls.
representation, it had merely held that on its own peculiar facts an action would 
not lie.
[1951] 2 K.B. at 177. In Law and Morals Lord Devlin himself seems to have 
thought
that Nocton was only a limited exception to the general rule denying liability for 
negli-
gent misrepresentation absent a contractual duty of truthfulness. Moreover, in 
his speech
in Hedley Byrne, Lord Devlin indicates that the misunderstanding of Derry was general
in the profession. [1964] A.C. at 528. This general misunderstanding, as well as his 
own
earlier feelings on the issue, may account for Lord Devlin's hesitation In indicating 
when
such liability would arise. [1964] A.C. at 523, 532. The question whether the infor-
mation was directly communicated to the person who relied upon it assumed 
an
importance in Lord Devlin's mind which it did not seem to have when he wrote 
Law
and Morals. See [1964] A.C. at 533.
32. It is sometimes asserted that the notion of rule is necessary to account for 
the
"binding" nature of law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CoNcEr oF LAw77-96 (1961). For one
who accepts it, a rule is a good reason for acting in the way the rule directs, over and
above prudential reasons which might exist. Such a person adopts what Hart calls an
"internal" point of view, as opposed to the "external" point of view of a person who
obeys a rule only because of fear of sanctions. Leaving aside the facts that rules cannot
be specified precisely and that most people are unaware of most of the so.called legal
rules which bind them, there still seem to be few people in society who can be said to
accept all of its rules as binding independently of fear of sanctions. "Internal" factors
may often play a small part in determining obedience to laws governing the sale of liquor,
sexual behavior, taxation, and traffic. To ask why law is binding is to ask more than 
a
logical question.
33. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCrION TrO LEGAL REASONING (1948). See also I.evi, The Nature
of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 398-403 (1965).
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overruled until it is possible to subsume the new case and the remain-
ing prior cases under a single rule. The present case will then be de-
cided in accordance with this rule. The process is repeated as new
cases arise. Levi characterized his method of legal reasoning as a "mov-
ing classification system.13 4 It has often been described as a process of
synthesis and resynthesis.3r
The late Professor Karl Llewellyn, who used a similar model of the
judicial process, described in greater detail the techniques courts use
in operating this moving classification system. 30 If, for example, a court
wishes to follow precedent, it could say that "the rule is too firmly
established to disturb, '37 thereby also affirming that the present case
was within the scope of the rule obtained from prior cases. If it wished
to avoid overruling previous cases, a court could say that each case of
the type before it "must be dealt with on its own facts,"3' 8 thus restrict-
ing the scope of the rule for which the prior cases stood. To extend
the reach of an earlier case, a court could lift some general language
from a prior case and put it into rule form without regard to the
limitations imposed by the facts of that case.30 In short, the decision-
making techniques that Llewellyn catalogued are means by which the
courts, in the process of synthesis and resynthesis, can openly or co-
vertly reformulate the rule for which the prior cases stand.
The difficulties with this model are immediately apparent. First,
the theory must recognize that subsequent courts are always free to
reformulate the rule of law for which prior cases stand. Furthermore,
as Levi4 and Llewellyn 41 both admit, there are no objective criteria
for deciding what is the correct rule of law to be found in any prior
case or cases. The latter is the more serious problem. If the theory is to
describe an objective decision-making procedure, it requires the exis-
34. Id. 398, 406. See also E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCrION TfO LEGAL REAso.-NnG, supra note33, at 1-3. Levi distinguished between cases and statutes on the gound that the words of a
statute are fixed authoritatively, although he admits that there 'may be some ambiguity inthe words used." Id. 28; cf. id. 30. He refers primarily to magueness rather than ambiguityin the strict sense. All words are to some extent vague; not all of them are ambiguous.
See Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 MuN. L. REv. 885 (1964). Thus the.moving dassification system" applies to statutes as well as cases, subject to Levi's proviso
that in interpreting statutes a rigorous notion of stare dedsis must be observed. E. Lavz,
supra note 33.
35. It seems to me that this terminology is the most usual. Cf. N. Dowwc;, E.
PATrERSON 8- R. PoiTwLu, MIATERIALS FOR LEGAL MErHOD 155-215 (1946).36. K. LLEW.LLYN, supra note 2, at 77-91. See also K. LLEvELLYN., Tim BRnBL Bus
56-69 (1951).
37. K. LLEtELIYN, supra note 2, at 77.
38. Id. at 84.
39. Id. at 79.
40. See E. LE, supra note 33, at 1-4.
41. See K. I.,.uLYN, supra note 2, at 62-63.
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tence of objectively discernible rules of law which serve as the starting
points of legal reasoning. In point of fact, however, there are logically
any number of rules of law to be derived from any case or series of
cases. In addition, because statements in prior judicial opinions are
themselves not rules of law but only evidence from which the correct
rules may be ascertained, the theory must acknowledge that there can
never be, even momentarily, an authoritative statement of a correct
rule of law. Yet under the theory, rules of law are the essential raw
material of legal reasoning.
Levi apparently recognized the difficulty of establishing correct or
true rules of law. He construed Professor Wechsler's call for "neutral
principles" as a plea for extending the synthesis of existing cases to in-
clude as many similar hypotheticals as one can realistically imagine,
and then rejected the plea as unwise.
42 He feared that, in attempting to
increase the rationality of judicial decisions, Professor Wechsler asked
too much of the courts. Levi suggested that Wechsler's request might
even be dangerous, because, in attempting to find a rule of law to cover
this extended range of hypotheticals, the courts may be led to decide
future cases prematurely and to foreclose the consideration of impor-
tant distinctions.
Professor Llewellyn was also aware of the difficulty of formulating a
correct rule of law from a case or series of cases. He expressed this
difficulty in terms of the "minimum" and "maximum" values of prece-
dent, or in other words, the narrow and broad interpretations of a
case.4 3 However, Llewellyn was never able to establish criteria for
deriving these minimum and maximum values, or for determining
whether a particular precedent should be given minimum, maximum,
or some intermediate value in a particular case. Thus Llewellyn was
forced to look beyond the mechanics of legal reasoning to support his
42. Levi, supra note 33, at 403-405. Part of Levi's objection to extending the synthesis
to as many hypothetical cases as possible seems to result from his assumption that the
ultimate basis of analogy is the "similarity" between the cases under consideration. See
E. LEV, supra note 33, at 7, 9. It is submitted that epistemologically this assumption Is
incorrect. There are an infinite number of differences and similarities among any 
group
of cases. A large number of similarities among the cases does not make the cases similar
if there are significant differences as well. Thus the usefulness of analog can be increased
by dealing with differences rather than similarities, for when a significant difference Is
found the inaccuracy of the analogy will have been demonstrated conclusively. The
situation is not unlike questions about the truth of scientific hypotheses. For example,
statements like "all swans are white" can only be disproved; they can never be proved
conclusively. See K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF ScIENTIFiC DISCOVERY 27-31 (1959). 
Thils
epistemological point of view is reflected in the model of legal reasoning to 
be presented
in section IV(B) infra.
43. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH, supra note 36, at 69. Cf. Merryman, The
Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954).
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thesis that the judicial activism of the past thirty years has not de-
stroyed the predictability of judicial decision-making. He found this
predictability in the fact that, in addition to generally accepted tech-
niques for handling precedents, there were also "correct results" to
cases. Certain results, moreover, were so important that courts would
occasionally be obliged to reach them regardless of what the accepted
means of arranging precedents would permit.4 4 In most situations,
technique and result were interrelated. Capable practitioners and
judges were aware of a "Law of Fitness and Flavor" which enabled
those who understood it to know what results justified what tech-
niques.45 Llewellyn posited finally a "Law of the Singing Reason"
which was fulfilled when "a rule which wears both a right situation-
reason and a clear scope-criterion on its face yields regularity, reckon-
ability, and justice all together."4 In short, the law was predictable
because it was a craft with known techniques, whose practitioners had
long apprenticeships and whose goals were those of common sense.
Since the decision-makers, the judges, were visible, the astute attorney
was able to observe the responses of judges and thus to assemble the
package of result and technique that was best for a particular court.
No one can deprecate the value of Llewelyn's insights into the
nature of the judicial process. However, more important for our pur-
poses is the fact that his herculean attempt to demonstrate the predict-
ability of judicial decision-making by means of the traditional model
was forced to revert to a sense of craft and the notion of skill. The
occasional contention that there is a correct decision for every case,
even if it cannot be shown what that decision isy seems no more than
an extension of Llewellyn's view of the legal process as a skilled craft
and of the lawyer as a skilled craftsman or even an artist. While a
description of law as art may satisfy lawyers reminiscing at their clubs,
44. K. LLEIWvLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 36, at 219.22.
45. Id. 222-23.
46. Id. 183.
47. That this surprising view-that for any judge there is only one correct decision.
even if others cannot ascertain what it is--should be expressed by men of great abilit)
is evidence of the felt need for objectivity in the law and of the inability of traditional
models to meet this need. See Dworkin, supra note 13; Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, supra
note 14; cf. MacCollum, supra note 14. See also Sartorius, The Justification of the Judicial
Decision, 78 Ermcs 171 (1968). In concluding that judges must proceed upon the asstunp.
tion that there is a uniquely correct decision for every case, Professor Sartorius asserts the
demonstrability of uniquely correct decisions in most cases, including most "hard" cases.
Id. 185. This assertion is unwarranted. The go-kart case, presented in note 19 supra and
accompanying text, was not unusually difficult, and yet most observers would say that it
had no uniquely correct decision. The same may certainly be said for most "hard" cases.
For a recent discussion of these and other difficulties of the traditional views of legal
reasoning, see Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Ahfaking, 46 . . B.A REv. 405,
428-37 (1968).
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it would be disquieting if this were the only answer that can be made
to laymen who claim that law is not an objective process. The profes-
sion must provide a better rationale than this or prepare to abandon
its pretensions.
C. Inadequacies of the Realist Approach
Out of dissatisfaction with legal theories of this type, with their
focus on unknowable entities and their invitations to sophistry, the
legal realists emphasized the study of what the courts in fact were do-
ing. The realist reaction was stimulated by traditional theories which
insisted upon the existence of particular "rules of law" even after
courts had decided cases in a manner irreconcilable with their exis-
tence.48 The difficulties of the realist theories arose largely when they
were pursued beyond a justified emphasis on what the courts were
doing and beyond the unquestionable requirement that a theory of
legal reasoning must help to predict the outcomes of future cases.
When some realists took the further step of defining law as a set of
predictions of the outcomes of future cases, the law became even more
unknowable and unidentifiable than before.49 Obviously, the theory
could not be used by judges who were interested in finding out what
they ought to do and not in predicting what they would do. Moreover,
in the absence of an authoritative prediction-maker, whose very exis-
tence would make the theory meaningless, the question arose as to
whose predictions were correct. In certain situations, furthermore, one
might feel that no reliable prediction could be made. Are unreliable
predictions law? What if a court decided a case contrary to the pre-
dictions of the entire bar? Since the theory would not permit one to
say that the court was wrong, he would be forced to conclude that it
was merely an instance of bad prediction. Attractive as it was to view
the law as a set of predictions of actual human behavior-for surely
legal theory must provide a basis for predicting the outcomes of future
48. This is theoretically possible under the Blackstonian view that judicial decisions
are only "evidence" of what the law actually is, and that "it sometimes may happen that
the judge may mistake the law." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMIENTARIEs "71. If a theory dis-
tinguishing judicial decisions from law is to be comprehensible, however, law must be
defined as the prediction of the long-range trend of judicial decisions. Otherwise, to
maintain that a particular decision was not law would be tantamount to asserting that
the critic had some special vision of truth which others lacked.
49. The problem is discussed with reference to the relevant literature in Christie, Tie
Notion of Validity in Modern Jurisprudence, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1964). At that time
I believed that, although the law could not be defined as predictions of future judicial
action, it could profitably be considered a collection of norms, a position which, a% will be
made clear in § III infra, I have abandoned.
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cases-the attempt to define law in terms of predictions was doomed
to failure.
II. Law and Argumentation
Despite the many disappointments that have been experienced in
the attempt to find criteria which establish the objectivity of judicial
decision-making, the quest for these criteria has been resuscitated as
part of the modem revival of the study of argumentation. The man
most prominently associated with this revival is the Belgian philos-
opher Chaim Perelman.o Perelman studied the techniques of practical
reasoning and argument discussed by Aristotle in the Topics and the
Rhetoric, applying and extending them to the problems of modem
argumentation. Aristotle divided practical reasoning into two basic
categories.51 The first, called dialectical reasoning, consists of reasoning
deductively from premises that are only probable or that are generally
but not universally considered true.52 Because the premises used in
dialectical reasoning are not necessarily true, the conclusions, though
deduced correctly from these premises, will also not necessarily be true.
Aristotle called the premises of dialectical reasoning topoi and in the
Topics supplied a great number of examples of them.53 Topoi are
typically common-place statements such as, "what is desired for its own
sake is more desirable than what is desired only for its effects," or,
"'of two things not otherwise distinguishable, that which produces the
more beneficial effects is the more desirable."' 5 The topoi are not dis-
similar in function from many maxims of the law, particularly those
50. Perelman's major work is the two-volume TRnrrt DE LAR0tuGmNTATi N (1958) which
he co-authored with MAne. L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. This work has recently been translated
into English. C. PErutAu, THE Nmv RHetomRic, A TtrATisE ON AR0UmE.NATiON (J. Wilkin-
son 9- P. Weaver transls. 1969) [hereinafter cited as TrATmE]. Where pages in the TnrAna
are cited, parallel citations to the French edition will appear in brackets. Some of the
papers reprinted in C. PmrrauN, Tm IDEA OF JUSTICE AND TE PROnLE.- OF AcumFinr
(Petrie transl. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Tim IDEA OF JusTIcE] are similar to chapters in
the Treatise.
51. Cf. 1EirorIC Book I, cbs. 1-2, 1354a-1356b25, in I1 Tim Woars OF AmoE TnAs-
tAr.T INTO ENGLISH (W. Ross ed. 1928) [hereinafter cited as Aiurr ]; ANA. Posr. Book I,
d. 1, 71al-10, in 1 ApmnrOmE-
52. Topics Book III, ch. 1, 100aSMff, in 1 Aus'ro=a; Topics Book I, ch. 10, 104a5ff, in
1 ARISTOTLE.
53. See especially Books 1-ViM of the Topics. Aristotle sometimes called the syllogisms
formed from the topoi enthymemes (ANAL. PR. Book H1, ch. 27, 70al0, in I ARsrTTE), al-
though he elsewhere restricts the term to the description of syllogisms which appear in the
process of rhetorical reasoning. Raeroic, supra note 51, Book I, d. 2, 1356bl-20. But cf.
RHEroRaic Book I, ch. 1, 12 1555a1-10.
54. Topics, supra note 52, Book Mr, ch. 1. 116a27-31.
55. Topics, supra note 52, Book I, ch. 2, 117a5-15.
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of statutory interpretation.5 Like legal maxims, topoi can frequently
be marshalled in support of contradictory conclusions.
Aristotle's second broad category of practical reasoning was rhetori-
cal argument, which is concerned with persuasion and thus, should the
discussion pertain to possible courses of action, with motivating the
listener to act in a certain way.5 7 Rhetoric employs a variety of tools.
The astute orator will not only use dialectical reasoning but will also
appeal to the presuppositions and the prejudices of his audience. He
will know how to enhance his own prestige in order to dispose his
audience to accept his views and how to destroy the prestige of his
opponents in order to undermine the effects of their arguments.
Perelman was concerned with both dialectical and rhetorical argu-
ment.58 He noted, of course, that the common-place statements which
can serve as premises in practical reasoning will vary with one's society
and audience.Y° He pointed out contemporary examples of the com-
monplace arguments found in Aristotle and other ancient writers.00
Perelman's major emphasis, however, was upon rhetorical argument-
upon persuading people to accept one's conclusions and to act in ac-
cordance with one's wishes."' In the main, his discussion was an expan-
sion of Aristotle's method of analysis. His stressed that, in the last
analysis, the test of a good argument is whether it succeeds with the
audience to which it is addressed.
62
Perelman concluded from his study of argumentation that the major
problems of legal reasoning concern the "interpretation" of legal rules.
Interpretation occurs (a) when there is a conflict between two existing
rules, 63 (b) when it is claimed that an otherwise applicable rule is not
56. For a listing of typical maxims of statutory construction and a demonstration of
the fact that different maxims can be marshalled in favor of contradictory decisions, see
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Ray. 395 (1950). Much of this article Is
reproduced as Appendix C to K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, at 521. For the broader "maxims
of equity," see 2 J. POMEROY, EQurry 363 (1941).
57. For a discussion of the scope and purpose of Aristotle's conception of rhetoric, see
RHETORIC, supra note 51, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (1355b25ff). See also id. Bik. I, Ch. I (1354aff).
58. TREATISE 1-9 [1-12]; ef. THE IDEA OF JUsTIcE 134-142.
59. TREATISE §§ 2-9, 21, 26, 27. Perelman observes, however, that there are general
groupings into which common-place statements of varying content can be placed. The
categories which he notes are quality, quantity, order, existence, essence, and person. Id. 85
[114]. See also id. §§ 22-24.
60. Id. §§ 21-24.
61. Id. 1-9 [1-12]. Perelman's conclusions regarding the techniques of rhetorical argu-
ment do not differ significantly from those of Aristotle. See id. 5-8 [6-10]. See also id.
§§ 1-12.
62. See id. §§ 1-10.
63. Id. 196-197 [264-265], 200 [269], 414-15 [554-55]. Cf. id. 59 [78-79], where Perelman
notes that there may be a conflict in the interpretation of a particular rule similar to the
conflict between two rules.
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valid,64 or (c) when there is no applicable rule on the subject but the
judge is legally obliged to decide the case.0 5 He did not, however, at-
tempt to provide more enlightenment on these problems of interpreta-
tion than to remind us of the obvious point that the normal techniques
of argumentation will apply. Not surprisingly, Perelman concluded
that analogical reasoning plays a relatively minor role in legal argu-
ment, because what many people would call analogical reasoning Perel-
man believes to be only the presentation of examples or instances of
general rules.66 He did not discuss at any length the application of
law to concrete factual situations, since he assumed that such applica-
tion is a rule-directed activity and therefore easier than "interpreting"
or establishing the existence of rules of law. 7 Because of these assump-
tions, Perelman had little to say about legal reasoning that is particu-
larly helpful or novel. Though Perelman's work on argumentation
and its uses as a means of persuasion is interesting and perceptive, the
reasons for the supposed objectivity of judicial decision-making will
not be found there.
The assumption that legal conclusions are controlled by rules under-
lies much of the other contemporary philosophical discussion about the
nature of non-formal argumentation.08 The fallacy of this assumption
is particularly well illustrated by the conclusions of Professor Julius
64. Id.59 [78-79].
65. Id. 59-60 [78-79], 131 [176]. Perelman discusses this situation in substantially the
same manner in THE IDEA OF JusTIcE 100-01. The judge is "legally obliged to decide the
case" under some European codes which put the judge "under an obligation to give judg-
ment under pain of denial of justice." Another legal problem discussed in both the Trea-
tise and The Idea of Justice is the use of presumptions of fact as starting points of legal
argument. TREAT=sE 102-104 [136-140]; THE IDEA OF JusriCE 102-108.
66. TR-ATsE 373-374 [502-503].
67. Perelman discusses the application of legal rules as a subcategory of interpretation.
If there is doubt about the applicability of a rule, it must first be made more precise so
that its applicability or inapplicability becomes self-evident. TREATISE 241 [325], 351 [472],
354-55 [477], 356-57 [479-480].
68. See, e.g., S. TouLmN, THE PLACE OF REAso.0N IN ETIcs (1950). Toulmin asserts that,
just as rules are institutionalized "good reasons" for conclusions in legal arguments, similar
good reasons can be found in ethical arguments. The use of legal analogy pervades Toul-
min's THE USES OF ARGUMENT (1958). In THE LOGIC OF CHoICE (1968), Professor G. Gottlieb
discusses the problem of legal decision-making to support his thesis that choice in the law
is "guided" by rules. Like Toulmin, Gottlieb builds on Ryle's notion that rules are "infer-
ence tickets" [see R=s., "If," "So," and "Cause" in PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIs 323 (Mf. Black
ed. 1950)] concluding that rules "guide" legal decision-making by leading from the "material
facts" to the decision of the case. G. GorrLu, supra this note, 32-49. "What facts are ma-
terial is to be determined by (i) the applicable rule, (ii) maxims and rules of interpreta-
tion, (iii) moral rules and principles, (iv) economic and social considerations, and (v) the
consequences of the proposed decision. If this is how rules of law guide decisions, then the
control they exercise does not justify a claim that judicial decision-making is an objective
process. Moreover, it is often the purpose of law to exclude from consideration standards
like race, sex, and wealth because they are deemed immaterial.
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Stone, who actually tried to apply Perelman's work to legal analysis.
09
Stone was unable to say more than that leading cases serve the func-
tion of Perelman's common-place seats of argument, or Aristotle's
topoi.70 This observation is not especially valuable, as Stone himself
acknowledged.71 The basic and difficult question is how legal topoi
are used and how it can be said that particular legal decisions are
correctly derived from these starting points. If there are no means of
answering these questions, it would be hard to say that there is any-
thing objective in legal reasoning; one would be led to conclude that
legal reasoning, far from being a more rigorous form of argument,
suffers from all the defects of ordinary argument. Thus contemporary
legal and philosophical writing on the nature of argumentation has
not helped significantly to confirm our intuition that judicial decision-
making is objective. If anything, an examination of this literature
makes us start to doubt our instincts. Perhaps our trouble has been
that we have been proceeding upon a wrong assumption as to the
nature of legal reasoning. We must therefore begin again and ask our-
selves what we mean by legal reasoning.
III. Preliminaries to a Fresh Approach
A. Reference Points for a Theory of Legal Reasoning
We start from the premise that if judicial decision-making is objec-
tive it must have objectively discernable reference points. It has been
suggested that rules of law provide such reference points and that they
may even be considered the premises of legal reasoning. Yet the lack of
an authoritative form for the so-called rules of the common-law, to-
gether with their incompleteness, makes them inadequate for this
role, however useful they might be for other purposes.7
2 If one is
seeking something that he can call "the law," if he is seeking the fixed
reference points of legal reasoning, all he will find are those marks on
paper called statutes and cases. Although the authoritative style in
which statutes are stated seems to differentiate them from cases, I
shall disregard the distinction for present purposes because I wish to
69. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYER'S REASONINGS, supra note 4, at 325-37. See also
J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JusTICE, supra note 4, at 768-81.
70. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYER'S REASONINGS, supra note 4, at 334-35.
71. Id. 335.
72. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. It is often desirable to summarize legal
knowledge or to express our conclusions about a particular legal question. Labelling such
summaries rules is not harmful so long as one does not endow them with an authoritative-
ness which neither legal theory nor reality permits them to bear.
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make dear that only the uninterpreted statute is unambiguously law,
just as only the uninterpreted case is law. There is no transcendental
world of "meaning" in which we can take refuge when debating the
meaning of a particular case or statute.73 Whether adequate or inade-
quate, vague or precise, the words must speak for themselves however
little they may tell us. Legislative history and the climate of the time
may assist in interpreting a statute and in predicting tie outcome of a
case, but they provide nothing specific enough to be incorporated in
a definition of the law. If we wish to identify something as the law,
then it is a statute which is the law and not a statute plus its legisla-
tive history. Similarly, insofar as they are part of the law, cases
themselves are the law and not cases plus the ratio decidendi, "rule,"
or "rule of law" that one might wish to superimpose on them.
The importance of insisting that only the raw form of a statute is
definite enough to be called "the law" and the great danger inherent
in attempts to hypostatize one's interpretation of statutory provisions
into a "rule of law" are graphically shown by an example from the life
of Justice Holmes. Holmes was an ardent supporter of the result in
Hepburn v. Griswold,74 which struck down a congressional attempt to
make paper money legal tender. Soon after that decision, Holmes
wrote a letter to the American Law Review defending the result of
the case. He argued,
It is hard to understand, when a power is expressly given, whichdoes not come up to a required height, how this express powercan be enlarged as an incident to some other express power. The
power to "coin money" means, I take it . . . (1) to strike offmetallic medals (coin), and (2) to make those medals legal tender
(money). I cannot therefore, see how the right to make paper legaltender can be claimed for Congress when the Constitution vir-tually contains the words "Congress shall have power to make
metals legal tender." It is to be remembered that those who denythe power have only to maintain that it is not granted by implica-
tion. They are not called on to find a constitutional prohibition.-,
73. The Constitution does not differ in this respect from ordinary statutes and caselaw. Even if, as is often contended, the provisions of the Constitution have a fixed mean-ing, the reformulation of that meaning into directly applicable terminology must remainunauthoritatve. See Senator Ervin's speech concerning the Senate's consideration of thenomination of Justice Fortas for Chief Justice, 114 CoNe. Rie. 11538, S. 11539-40 (dailyed. Sept. 27, 1968). See also Senator Ervin's article in The Washington Post, Sept. 15. 1969,§ B (Outlook), at 2, col. 1, and Thurman Arnold's reply, id. col. 5.
74. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
75. 4 Amm L. REv. 768 (1870). The letter is signed "H.," and is ascribed to Holmesby Howe in the second volume of his biography of Justice Holmes. M. HowE, ojtsc
OLIVER WENELL HoLmEs: TmE PROVING YEARs 52 (1963).
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Nevertheless, shortly after the letter was published, a differently-con-
stituted Court overruled Hepburn v. Griswold, despite the vigorous
dissent of Justice Fields, who adopted Holmes's argument.
70
The fallacy in Holmes's argument was pointed out several years
later by James Bradley Thayer,
77 who found Holmes's reasoning "ob-
viously defective" 78 Thayer correctly pointed out that Holmes's error
lay in the syllogism on which he based his argument.
7 Holmes's initial
premise that Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution empowers 
Con-
gress "to coin money" was unexceptionable. However, his restatement
of this provision as a grant of power "to strike off metallic medals
(coins) and to make these medals legal tender (money)" imputed 
to
the Constitution an explicitness which it lacked. If Holmes had 
taken
the constitutional text as he found it, his argument would have 
had
to take a different form, which Thayer stated as follows: "(a) Congress
has an express power to coin money; (b) in that is implied a power 
to
make it a legal tender; and (c) this implied power excludes an implied
power to make anything else a legal tender."
' 0 As Thayer himself con-
cluded, "That argument is not a strong one."'
Of course, even if we agree that objectively discernable reference
points are desirable, the question remains whether even statutes 
and
cases can fulfill that purpose. I would answer that as an empirical 
fact
they can. Experienced legal observers can agree among themselves 
as
to whether a particular identifiable object is a statute or 
a case, even
when these terms are taken in a broad sense to include constitutional
provisions (as in the Holmes example), administrative regulations 
and
decisions, and local ordinances. This much understanding is sufficient
for purposes of the following discussion.
The contention that the only identifiable things which can 
accu-
rately be called law are statutes and cases is not, of course, a novel 
one.
Joseph Bingham presented the argument persuasively over 
50 years
ago.82 Bingham shrewdly pointed out a contradiction in the 
traditional
76. Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 
(12 Wall.) 457 (1871).




81. Id. Apparently, Holmes eventually acknowledged his 
error. See M. HowE, supra
note 75, at 55. Howe intimates that Holmes may have 
come to believe that syllogistic
reasoning should not play a dominant role in the resolution 
of constitutional issues. How-
ever, it is not Holmes's reliance on syllogistic reasoning 
that accounts for his error, but
rather his substitution of an abstraction of his own creation 
for the words of the Con-
stitution.
82. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Micii. L. REv. 1, 1-25, 
109-121 (1912). In Eric R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court rejected 
the view that the common
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requirement that courts must find general rules under which new cases
can be subsumed before any such cases can be decided,
3 On the one
hand, courts were instructed to decide only the case before them and
not to decide moot questions or to give advisory opinions; on the
other hand, the requirement that they base decisions on general rules
in fact compelled them to determine what would be the proper de-
cision in cases not before them. Bingham was met, however, with
Morris Cohen's contention that his views were "old nonsense."
8 4
Cohen argued that, if the law consisted only of statutes and cases, there
was no way of explaining how the courts proceeded from decided cases
to the decision of new ones. 5 It is true that Bingham's inability to
answer this question was a serious short-coming of his work.Y Yet
Bingham's point was that the traditional view of law as a collection of
rules did not satisfactorily explain how to proceed from decided cases
to new cases either, and, indeed, that it obscured the process.
87 My
purpose in what follows is to remedy this short-coming in Bingham's
work.
B. Necessary Assumptions
We have shown that the reference points of judicial reasoning, the
statutes and the cases, can be ascertained in an objectively valid man-
ner. Our problem is to examine whether it is possible to contend that
judicial decision-making, based as it is on the statutes and the cases,
is an objective process. In considering this problem, it will be neces-
sary to make an assumption about the social objectives of the judicial
process. It will be assumed that the primary social purpose of
the judicial process is deciding disputes in a manner that will, upon
reflection, permit the loser as well as the winner to feel that he has
been fairly treated.88 As Professor Fuller has contended, this goal requires
that courts grant the parties the right to present proofs and reasoned
law could have any foundation other than state statutes and state court decisions. ling-
ham, however, was making the more fundamental point that the law of a state was not
only found in the statutes and decisions; it was the statutes and decisions.
83. Bingham, Legal Philosophy and the Law, 9 ILu. L. REV. 98, 112 (1914).
84. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 CoLU~t. L RE%. 352, 361 (1931).
85. Id. 362-63.
86. Kocourek raised this point in a review of Bingham's What is the Law?. supra note
82, although he was not as unsympathetic to Bingham's views as was Cohen. Kocourek-,
Review, 8 111- L. REv. 138 (1913).
87. Bingham, supra note 83, at 102-103.
88. Whether any particular loser in the judicial forum will feel this way is another
question. We are concerned with the optimum conditions for making it possible for lofers
to feel this way.
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arguments to them and that the courts squarely meet the proofs and
reasoned arguments addressed to them by the parties.89
In performing these tasks, the courts will not and should not be
oblivious to what they deem are the demands of justice or of social
policy. All men, including judges and lawyers, are goal-oriented and
can be expected to utilize all available means, including the legal sys-
tem, to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, the furtherance of social
and moral ends or the achievement of other goals through the judicial
process should be secondary to its function of deciding fairly disputes
between the parties who invoke it. Under this view, therefore, the
courts are in a position somewhat similar to that of the managers of a
game who wish to make the conditions of play such that the losers as
well as the winners will wish to continue to play. The fairness of the
judicial process should not be sacrificed even in the name of other so-
cial or moral goals, and the courts will therefore at times be unable to
pursue social or moral goals because of the requirement that the ju-
dicial process be fair.
Almost everyone would agree that the fair decision of disputes be-
tween the parties before the courts is an important function of the
judicial process, but it is crucial to note that courts and commentators
have not always been willing to treat it as the central social function
of judicial decision-making. As will subsequently be made clear, how-
ever, if fairness to the parties in the resolution of their disputes is not
accepted as the primary social function of the judicial process, it will
be impossible to maintain that the process is objective. Moreover, one
could think of better ways to resolve basic social and political disputes
than the judicial process. Its stylized procedures, its restricted fact-
finding processes, and the limited number of parties present in any
case, make it particularly ill-suited to the resolution of such disputes.00
89. L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication 26, December 29, 1959 (paper
delivered in Chicago before the Association of American Law Schools). An abbreviated
version of this paper was delivered at the 1960 meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 PaocErm us OF TnE Am. Soa'Y
OF INT'L LAW 1 (1960). See also Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIs,
L. REv. 3.
90. Cf. articles cited notes I and 2 supra. See also Wellington & Albert, Statutory Inter.
pretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547
(1963). The unwillingness of the parties to call relevant witnesses can often severely limit
the ability of the courts to ascertain all the relevant facts. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 46 (1948) (neither plaintiff nor defendant called the only eyewitness to the acci-
dent other than the plaintiff); cf. Fowler v. Fowler, [1949] Ont. W.N. 244 (C.A.). See also
Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 IARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284.85,
1293-96 (1952). This is not, of course, to deny that courts have an important law.making
function in implementing basic policy decisions made by those who have adopted a con.
stitution or enacted legislation, or in rationalizing inconsistencies in the common law.
Hart, Comment on "The Courts and Lawmaking," in LEGAL INSTITUTIONs TODAY AND To-
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Perhaps in more primitive times, when the courts policed the morals
of the community through the construction of common-law crimes,91
the courts were obliged to play this role because more adequate ma-
chinery did not exist. Today, however, the justification for such a role
is considerably weakened. Indeed, if the resolution of the great issues of
the day is the most important function of the judicial process, it is not
surprising that the courts are unable to propound neutral principles;
under these circumstances, the only way in which the courts could
satisfy the demand for neutral principles and reasoned decisions would
be to provide a comprehensive and publicly acceptable theory of gov-
ernment and economic organization. This is surely an impossible task.
Even courts that would make fairness the chief goal of the judicial
process may fail to achieve it for at least two reasons. Occasionally the
courts, under the pressures of the calendar, decide cases either on
issues not raised by the parties or on points only cursorily briefed and
argued. A particularly glaring example of this failing was the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 12
in which the Government attacked du Pont's holding of 23% of all
General Motors common stock. The case was tried and argued almost
exclusively under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because the par-
ties had no indication that any other statutory provisions mentioned
in the complaint were relevant. In the Supreme Court, on the Gov-
ernment's appeal from the dismissal of the complaint, only a few pages
at the end of the briefs and the last few minutes of oral argument were
moRRow 40 (Paulsen ed. 1959) refers to the judiciary's "primary responsibility for all ques-
tions of interstitial and subordinate polcy making presented in the cases coming before
the courts. Id. 45. Cf. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of
Tort Law, 48 MiaN. L. Ray. 265 (1963). Professor Peck supports a role for the courts in
the field of tort law rather more extensive than most observers would recognize. For
example, he believes that the courts should abolish the defense of contributor) negligence
and substitute for it a system of comparative negligence. Id. 304-07.
91. A distressing recent example of the construction of a common law crime is Shaw
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220 (1951). The House of Lords, inter alia,
affirmed Shaw's conviction on a count charging him with the common-law crime of con-
spiracy to corrupt public morals, in publishing a directory of prostitutes. Counsel for Shaw
argued that conspiracy to corrupt public morals did not constitute a common-law crime
at all, much less one sufficiently broad to cover the conduct involved in the case. Id. at 241.
In commenting on Shaw, Lord Devlin noted that "the Crown only cited three reported
cases of conspiracy to corrupt public morals since Lord Mansfield's dictum in 1763." Devlin,
Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 635, 647 (1962).
For a more recent and less disturbing common law crime case see Regina v. Llewellyn-
Jones, [1967] 3 All E.R. 225 (CA.) (misuse of public office). For American cases in the few
states still retaining common-law crimes, see, e.g., State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 159 S..
2d 1 (1968) (going armed with dangerous weapons to the terror of the people); Common-
wealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955) (soliciting sodomy and using
lewd, immoral and filthy language over the telephone).
92. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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devoted to Clayton Act cases. 93 Indeed, counsel for du Pont made no
reference to the Clayton Act until Justice Douglas raised the question
at the end of counsel's argument. The Court nevertheless decided the
case under Section 7 of the Clayton Act by drastically reinterpreting
that provision. Whether such reinterpretation was justified is not the
point at issue. Rather, the point is that however certain the court was
that its decision was correct, at the very least the parties were entitled
to reargument and perhaps even to a remand.
4
The second eroding factor is the subtle transformation of the role
of the amicus curiae from disinterested friend of the Court or spokes-
man for the public interest in the person of the Attorney General to
vociferous spokesman for private interests.
95 Under such a broad view
of his role an amicus may well attempt to take control of litigation.
Professor Mermin has shown in his studies of the fate of the Wisconsin
Development Authority that the Wisconsin Supreme Court twice ruled
on the constitutionality of the Authority on points raised for the first
time by an amicus curiae, despite the high quality of legal counsel
employed by both parties to the dispute.
90
An example on the federal level was the maneuvering which sur-
rounded the Rosenberg97 case at its last stages. After the case had
seemingly run its course, counsel for one Edelman, a man having no
connection with the litigation, filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus based on a ground which the "able and zealous" attorneys for
the Rosenbergs had fully considered and had rejected earlier in the
litigation. 8 Because the Rosenbergs were under sentence of death, the
93. See id. at 609 (Justice Burton dissenting). It should also be noted that the Court's
decision in du Pont overturned an administrative interpretation of forty years' standing.
An examination of the record indicates that only eight of one hundred pages of argument
in the Government briefs were devoted to the Clayton Act issue. The du Pont brief devoted
seven of two hundred fifty-five pages to the issue; the General Motors brief, eleven of ninety.
two.
94. A case as important as Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was overruled 5.4 in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), even though the appellant in Mapp did not cite the
Wolf case in his brief. Id. at 673, n.5 (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan). Cf. the Court's
willingness to discuss the merits of the case without the assistance of briefs or arguments
in Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969).
In Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965), the petitioner asserted
that it had been denied due process of law because the state supreme court had decided
the case on a basis not adequately presented in the record and the briefs. The Court did
not reach the issue, for it vacated the judgment in order to secure clarification of whether
the case had been decided below on federal or state grounds.
95. See Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694 (1963).
96. S. MERIN, JURISPRU D E A STATECRAFr (1963); Mermin, Concerning the Ways of
Courts: Reflections Induced by the Wisconsin "Internal Improvement" and "Public Pur.
pose" Cases, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 192.
97. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
98. Id. at 292 (concurring opinion of Justice Jackson).
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Supreme Court reluctantly decided to hear arguments on the issue.
Unless carefully regulated, the granting of an expanded role to the
amicus curiae, even in the name of the public interest, can partially
compromise the integrity of the judicial process. 0
These methods by which control of litigation can be taken away
from the parties are significant because the model of legal argument
that is about to be constructed demands at least that Professor Fuller's
minimal requirements of fairness be fulfilled. While Professor Fuller's
requirements are not by themselves a sufficient guarantee either of
fairness or of objectivity, the model will not work unless the parties to
a lawsuit are permitted to present proofs and arguments to the court
and unless the court responds to those proofs and arguments.
IV. A Fresh Approach
A. General
Our task, then, is to ascertain whether there are any reasonably ob-
jective means for determining how to proceed from the objectively-
given reference points of the judicial process-the statutes and the de-
cided cases-to the decision of new cases. In terms of the social func-
tion that we have posited for the legal system, only such a claim of
objectivity will make it possible for the losers in the judicial forum to
feel that they have been fairly treated. As we have noted, fairness re-
quires that a party before a judicial tribunal be permitted to present
proofs and arguments and that the tribunal's decision meet these proofs
and arguments. Beyond this minimum, we are obliged to provide cri-
teria which, if we are speaking in terms of "fairness," will permit us to
say that the proofs and arguments of the parties have been adequately
met and which, if we are speaking in terms of "objectivity," will per-
mit us to say that a case has been properly decided. Without such cri-
teria, a disappointed litigant cannot be criticized if he refuses to
acknowledge the objective character of the judicial process and if he
claims that the court's statements about his arguments are only win-
dow-dressing and that his participation in the process was merely a
charade.
In order to avoid confusion, it is important to make clear at the out-
set what we shall be saying when we declare that a case has been
properly decided. It is too stringent a requirement to impose upon a
99. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
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theory of legal argument to insist that, before we can claim that a case
was properly decided, we must show that the case could not have been
decided in any other way. It is impossible in many instances to estab-
lish objectively that there is only one correct decision to a case. The
model to be presented will claim, however, that it is possible to
establish objectively whether a decision was incorrectly decided, and
therefore whether a case was correctly decided in the sense of not be-
ing incorrectly decided, a property which several possible decisions of
a case can sometimes share. In the model, the terms "properly" and
"improperly" decided will refer to cases "correctly" and "incorrectly"
decided in the sense just indicated. If we can supply criteria for mak-
ing such claims, we will have shown that it is possible to construct a
model of legal argument which permits the conclusion that judicial
decision-making is an objective process. Criticism of judicial decisions
can then also have an objective foundation. In providing such criteria
and in constructing this model we shall at the same time be explaining
what it is for a court adequately to respond to the proofs and argu-
ments addressed to it by the parties.
B. The Model
We wish to propose the following model for legal argument. First,
legal reasoning differs from most other types of practical reasoning in
that its reference points are objectively given in the form of marks on
paper called statutes and cases. Legal reasoning is thus spared the argu-
ments over premises that characterize ethical disputes. Second, no new
case can be decided differently from any of the decided cases unless it
is "significantly different" from all such cases. A similar requirement
applies in the use and interpretation of statutes,100 whether or not they
have already been interpreted by prior cases. The model requires that
anyone who wishes to use a statute in the course of legal reasoning
give what he believes to be the paradigm case or cases covered by the
statute. "Presenting a paradigm case" does not mean divining the
"true meaning" of the statute-the model makes no such demand-
but only presenting a case as to which it is asserted that, whatever else
may also be covered by the statute, this case is. The party must then
argue that the instant case is or is not significantly different from any
such paradigm case. Thus, a party who asserts that a statute requiring
motor vehicles to pay a road tax is applicable to go-karts or to farm
100. In the discussion that follows, the term "statutes" will include constitutional pro-
visions, administrative regulations and local ordinances. Cf. Part III § A supra.
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tractors must state what he claims to be the paradigm case covered by
the statute. In this instance, the paradigm case would presumably be
the family motor car, although of course the bus or long-haul truck
might equally be paradigm cases under the statute.10' If a party were
unable to supply any such paradigm cases, he would be forced to
conclude that the statute was unintelligible.10 2 Cases also could be un-
intelligible, in the sense that people might be unable to reach even
minimal agreement as to their factual circumstances (e.g., whether the
plaintiff was run over by defendant's automobile) or even as to their
results (e.g., whether the plaintiff received judgment for $10,000). Un-
intelligible cases, however, are much less dangerous than unintelligible
statutes because they are more likely to be ignored.
When a case is brought before a court, any of the parties may assert
that the instant case is like a prior case or is governed by a particular
statute. Where the interpretation of a statute is at issue, a party will be
obliged, as has been explained above, to supply a paradigm case, unless
the statute has already been the subject of judicial decision and the
party is content to use the prior decision as a paradigm case. In default
of supplying such a paradigm, a party will be subject to the use of
paradigm cases supplied by the other party or by the court. Under the
model, no criterion of relevancy is imposed upon the cases that a party
claims are like the instant case or upon the statutes that a party claims
are applicable. Naturally, the model will work better if the parties
behave in good faith, but the model does not require any prior screen-
ing of cases and statutes. If one casts his net wide enough there are
some likenesses between any two cases decided within the same legal
system, and it is fruitless to argue about how many such likenesses are
necessary before one case can be said to control the decision of another.
101. Materials relating to legislative history will be helpful in establishing paradigm
cases. Undoubtedly, a concern with making the lawsuit as fair as possible a contest between
contending parties led Justice Jackson to condemn the use of legislative aids because
[a]side from a few offices in the larger cities the materials of legislative history are not
available to the lawyer who can afford neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of
housing, or the cost of repeatedly examining the whole congressional history.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (concurring opinion).
While one may share Justice Jackson's concern for the small town attorney, one cannot
ignore the growing urbanization of American society and the increased use of complex
legislation to meet social problems. Fairness seems to dictate broadening the distribution
of legislative materials, not restricting their use.
102. Because an unintelligible statute provides no basis on which one can regulate his
conduct, ideally one would hope that a totally vague statute would be declared void for
vagueness. Unfortunately, the void-for-vagueness cases show an "almost habitual lack of
informing reasoning," and the void-for-vagueness test is often a way of deciding cases with-
out articulating basic differences of policy between courts and legislatures. Note, The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L REv. 67, 70-71 (1960). Cf.
Christie, supra note 34.
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When the parties have cited the statutes and cases that they claim
control the instant case and the court has supplied to the parties its
own list of statutes and cases, the case will be ready for decision.
Naturally, in presenting the statutes and cases which they deem con-
trolling, the parties will also be presenting arguments to the court as
to why the case should be decided in their favor. These arguments will
have a bearing upon the court's decision for reasons that will appear
obvious once the mechanics of the judicial decision-making process
are described in greater detail. Under the model, the court is free to
decide the case in a manner different from that of the decided cases
and from the paradigm cases under statutes only if it can point to a
significant difference between the instant case and each of the decided
cases and paradigm cases.
In deciding the case before it, the court may also refer to hypo-
thetical cases posed by the parties or by the court itself. The consid-
eration of hypothetical cases is an important adjunct to the method
of reasoning now being presented, for hypothetical cases are of material
assistance in establishing the relation of the instant case to the prior
cases and to the paradigm cases. To be pertinent, a hypothetical case
must be one not significantly different from the instant case. A court
which has constructed or which is referred to such a hypothetical case
must then determine whether the hypothetical case is itself signifi-
cantly different from the prior cases and the pertinent paradigm cases.
For the court to decide the instant case in a particular way, not only
the instant case but also all pertinent hypothetical cases must be sig-
nificantly different from the prior cases and the paradigm cases point-
ing to a contrary result. Only then can it be said that the instant
case is truly significantly different from these cases and not just ap-
parently significantly different.
The use of hypothetical cases thus broadens the scope of a court's
inquiry and helps it to deal with the body of law which it is adminis-
tering. Hypothetical cases, for example, help a judge to appreciate the
reach of his decision by indicating the extent to which, in deciding
the instant case, he is committing himself to decide future cases in a
particular way. Similarly, hypothetical cases are a bridge between the
instant case and previously decided cases whose relevance to the instant
case the judge has not initially appreciated. In this way, hypothetical
cases broaden his understanding of existing legal materials and help
him to comprehend more fully their restraining influence on the
choices available to him in the instant case. At the same time, the
model requires that hypothetical cases themselves pass the significant
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difference test and thereby prevents their use from degenerating into
a ludicrous and improper reductio ad absurdum, the so-called "parade
of horrors" which law students are quite properly told to avoid.
103
The key to the basically analogical model of legal reasoning that is
being described here is the concept of a significant difference. Under
the traditionally-accepted model of legal reasoning discussed earlier,
two cases are considered similar if they illustrate the same general
rule and significantly different if they illustrate conflicting or incon-
sistent rules. This is not a particularly helpful test because there are
any number of rules, many conflicting and inconsistent, for which
two cases can stand. Depending upon which rule is accepted as "cor-
rect," it is possible, under the traditional model, to distinguish on its
facts any case from any other case or cases. The traditional model
thus provides an objective test of judicial decision-making only if
there is some way of choosing, in terms sufficiently concrete to be
useful, the "true" or "correct" rule for which a case or group of cases
stands. Unfortunately, experience has dearly confirmed that there is
not. Under the proposed model, on the other hand, the significant
differences between cases that will justify differences in result will lie
in the factual circumstances of the cases rather than in the rules or
principles which they supposedly illustrate. It should be clear that
this criterion is, as a logical matter, an easier one to meet. It is log-
ically more stringent to insist that, before any two instances ca be
classed as similar, one must construct a general rule or definition such
that all other instances which one might wish to characterize as similar
will fall within it, than it is to provide that any two cases will be con-
sidered similar if, according to whatever criterion of similarity is
imposed, they are within a certain degree of proximity.' ° The ad-
vantage of the model is that it is easier to decide whether a group of
cases are significantly different from one another according to any
given factual criterion than to decide the "proper" rule or rules under
which all these cases should be grouped. The only question is whether
we can realistically come close to fulfilling even this easier logical
requirement, and, even if we can, whether we will thereby be able to
show that judicial decision-making is an objective process.
The nub of our theory, then, is that it reduces disputes about the
propriety of judicial decisions to disputes about the significant factual
103. Cf. note 84 supra.
104. See Lucas, The Lesbian Rule, 30 PiL. 195, 204-213 (1955); cf. Mayo, Rule-mahing
and Rule-breaking, 15 ANALYSIS 16 (1954); see also Shrayder, Moral Rules and Moral
.Maxims, 67 ETwIcS 269 (1957).
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differences among cases. Naturally, in proposing which of the infinite
observable factual differences among cases should be examined, the
litigants and the judge will be influenced by their personal values and
goals, as well as by the particular results they desire in the instant case
and the empirical data at their disposal. While the judicial process is
not rule-controlled, it is, in the last analysis, an arena for purposive
activity ultimately founded on the human preferences and values
often grouped together under the rubric "policy."'10 The model, how-
ever, takes note of the fact that policies are often vague and amor-
phous and may also be limitless in number and conflicting. In order
to achieve an objective decision-making procedure, it therefore recog-
nizes policies only as they are filtered through the facts of the previ-
ously-decided cases and of the paradigm cases under statutes. This is
the point of the significant difference test. The model, furthermore,
tries to focus disputes about significant factual differences among cases,
in the realm of decidables, rather than in the realm of undecidables
as is the case with disputes about the "true" rule or principle for
which cases stand.
This focusing can be illustrated at several levels of argument. At
the simplest level, in attempting to determine what are in fact signifi-
cant differences among cases, there will be some differences among
cases which common sense will tell us are not significant. For example,
if the only difference betwen two cases is that in the first the plaintiff
had black hair and in the second he has red hair, common sense tells
us that this difference is so insignificant as to be even irrelevant. Of
course, a party is always free to contend that this factual difference is
significant, but, unless he can give some additional reasons, the court
will not accept his contention. 106 Beyond these easy cases, there will
be points of difference between cases that the decided cases and the
paradigm cases under statutes have already shown not to be signifi-
cant or not even to be relevant. This illustrates the proposition that
law can be viewed as a calculus, which builds on its established the-
105. Recognizing the importance of value judgments in the decisional process (that
may, with perfect propriety, be called rules or "rule-like') does not mean that we have
now recognized that legal reasoning is rule-controlled. See note 25 supra and ac-
companying text. The absence of an authoritative form of statement for the expression
of such value judgments and the fact that no particular value judgment is dispositive in
legal reasoning precludes the assertion that the recognition of the importance of values Is
an admission that legal reasoning is rule-controlled.
106. Under the more traditional theory of legal argument, while one might intuitively
know that such differences are insignificant, he would still be obliged to undertake the
additional and often unnecessary inquiry of determining whether the cases In question
stand for a rule expressed in terms of all men, all human beings, all adults, or all U.S.
citizens.
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orems, embodied in statutes and decided cases, using its characteristic
methods of transformation and standards of consistency.107 If a Cau-
casian man has recovered a judgment against the manufacturer of
ginger beer for negligently permitting a snail to get into the bottle,
it is not a significant difference, in our system of law, that in the next
ginger beer case the plaintiff is a woman or a Negro man. In other
words, whatever the personal scheme of values of the parties, the
empirically-given statutes and decided cases (which reflect the values
of our society) have refused to recognize factual differences of this
type as relevant in these situations. 08 Accordingly, such factual dif-
ferences are not significant under our model, for under it courts will
examine only those factual differences among cases whose relevance
has not already been rejected in the statutes and the decided cases.
Naturally, a party is always free to assert that differences in skin
color alone are significant factual differences. However, the universal
rejection of this assertion by the statutes and the unoverruled decided
cases, all of which must be distinguished under the model, will pre-
clude acceptance of the assertion. The statutes and decided cases will
also restrict the possible significant differences between cases even
when the relevance of certain types of facts, in a given set of circum-
stances, has to some extent been recognized. Thus in deciding whether
a particular factual difference is significant, a judge will find his
freedom to conclude that the difference is significant restricted by the
existence of prior cases which cannot be distinguished from the instant
cases and in which arguments asserting the significance of the distinc-
tion under consideration were rejected, because he will be obliged to
take into consideration the nature of such arguments and the circum-
stances in which they were made. 0
Next, there will be differences which scientific evidence will help
107. For a discussion of the calculus-like nature of law and the points at which law
resembles mathematics and logic, see Stone de Montpensier, The Compleat iVrangler. 50
MINN. L. REV. 1001 (1966); R. Stone, Affinities and Antirnonies in Jurisprudence, 1964
Gazm. L.J. 266, 280-285; cf. lk Stone, Ratiocination Not Rationalitation, 74 MLD 463
(1965). For an attempt to apply this analysis to the question of the binding effect of
precedent upon the House of Lords and to the notion of the ratio decidendi of a case,
see R. Stone, supra note 27.
108. If there were empirical evidence that Negroes were more, or less, susceptible to
the chemicals contained in the ginger beer bottle than Caucasians, a difference in race
might be a significant difference between the cases, but then the cases would not be ones
where there was merely a difference in race.
109. Suppose that a party argued that the number of persons injured by the defendant's
conduct constituted a significant difference between the instant case and a prior case. If.
in another case not significantly different from the instant case, a court had rejected the
argument that the difference was significant because multiple lawsuits would burden the
courts, that case would be relevant. The party would have to supply an additional
factual distinction to support his claimed significant difference.
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show to be either totally irrelevant to the instant case, or, if the dif-
ferences have some connection with the case, factually insignificant.
For example, in one case of intentional homicide the victim may have
died immediately from gunshot wounds; in another, quite properly
carrying the same penalty, the victim may have lived for hours after
being shot and then succumbed despite the best efforts of competent
physicians. Scientific evidence here demonstrates that the time factor
is irrelevant. The importance of scientific evidence will not, of course,
be limited to such clear cases. In a suit to enjoin the operation of an
airport as a nuisance, for example, the total yearly traffic of the airport
will be of more practical importance, in distinguishing among the
cases, than the assertion that "the public interest requires airports;"
and the decibel level of sound created by the planes will be more
important than the maxims sic utere tuo or cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum.
The model of judicial decision-making being presented will pro-
mote every effort to reduce disputes about significant differences to
disputes over measurable differences, or to disputes about matters
susceptible to scientific examination. Of course, there will remain a
class of cases involving factual differences whose significance, despite
all available scientific evidence, is still disputable. Here, the advocate
has leeway in argument, and a tribunal has leeway in decision. Never-
theless, regardless of what the tribunal may think of the justice of the
claim and regardless of its view of social policy, in order to decide any
two cases differently it must come up with at least a plausible signifi-
cant factual difference between them. By "plausible" is meant a dif-
ference which is accepted as such by the vast majority of observers.
The parallel to scientific reasoning is apparent. What makes a scien-
tific conclusion or hypothesis plausible is that its justification conforms
to certain widely accepted standards for evaluating empirical evidence.
In this approach to legal reasoning, a conclusion is accepted as plausible
not because of any intrinsic characteristics, but because its justification
conforms to certain accepted standards for evaluating empirically
given legal materials. In law as in science, we proceed by using a
previously agreed upon method of arriving at conclusions on the
basis of the evidence available." 0
It is submitted that this model of legal argument, because it con-
110. The fact that a court has convincingly shown that its decision in a particular case
was not controlled by the statutes and the prior cases, and thus that it is free to follow
admittedly distinguishable cases or to strike out in new directions, does not guarantee
that people will like the decision which the court reaches. This will depend on the court's
skill in justifying its decision.
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trols the decisions of courts' and protects the participation of the
parties in the resolution of their disputes, will permit the assertion
that judicial decision-making is objective and fair. This is something
that the traditional model of legal reasoning does not permit. The
supposed conflict between logic and experience in the law arises only
when the decision-makers focus on the construction of ersatz general
rules to which experience must somehow be made to conform.
C. The Model and Recent Judicial Decisions
In order briefly to illustrate the model of legal reasoning that has
been constructed and to document its promise of reducing legal dis-
putes to arguments over observables, it may be helpful to use the
model as a critical tool for examining several comparatively recent
decisions of the Supreme Court. In the course of this examination, an
indication will be given of what would have been proper decisions in
cases which were not properly decided in terms of the model. Al-
though some of the cases involved questions of constitutional inter-
pretation, all of them were purportedly decided in the traditional
judicial manner; none were cases in which the Court acknowledged
exercising any basic legislative or political function entrusted to it
by the Constitution.
In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,"
2  the
Florida courts had adjudged the petitioner in contempt of the Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee. The Investigation Committee
was a duly-constituted committee of the Florida State Legislature and
had summoned Gibson, the President of the Miami Branch of the
N.A.A.C.P., to appear and to bring with him the membership lists of
his chapter. Gibson appeared but did not bring the lists. When asked
if certain persons previously identified as Communists or members of
Communist front organizations were members of his branch, he testi-
Ill. Because of its rigorous attention to particulars, some major contemporary philos.
ophers have found the law a fruitful source of illustrations in their examnination of non-
deductive reasoning. See, eg., A Plea for Excuses in J. AusrtN, Pnt.osor natt. PE s 123.
135-96 (1961); Wisdom, The Logic of God, in J. VIsDOm. supra note 25 at 1; Wisdom,
Gods, in J. WIsDOM, PHILosoP HY AND PsYcHo-ANALYsts 149, 152-59 (1957); Wisdom, Phi-
losophy, Metaphysics, and Psycho-Analysis, in id. 248; cj. Banbrough, Principia Meta-
physica, 39 Pu. 97 (1964). Wisdom's famous metaphor, in Gods, characterizing reasons it;
non-deductive reasoning as "legs of a chair" rather than "links of a chain" is often cited
by legal philosophers in conjunction with their discussions of Perelnan's work on argu.
mentation. See J. SrONE, supra note 22, at 327; Weiler, supra note 47, at 431, n.mr. It
must be kept in mind, however, that, unlike Perelman, Wisdom is interested not mercl
(and not so much) in persuading as in arriving at truth. For Wisdom, deduction is not
the only means of deriving true condusions, and he uses legal illustrations in order to
demonstrate his contention.
112. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
1341
The Yale Law Journal
fled that he could not associate these persons with the N.A.A.C.P. and
that the N.A.A.C.P. had taken action to exclude subversives from its
ranks. Fourteen people who had been identified in previous testimony
before the Committee as Communists or members of Communist
fronts had been mentioned as having participated in the affairs of the
Miami branch of the N.A.A.C.P. As to these fourteen, Gibson was
asked to check his lists to ascertain whether they were in fact members.
At the same time, he was advised that he was not being asked to turn
the lists over to the Committee. Nevertheless, he refused to consult
the lists and for this refusal was adjudged in contempt.
Florida tried to support the decision of the state courts by pointing
out that the Court had upheld the right of congressional and state
legislative committees to require testimony and the production of
evidence in comparable circumstances. For example, it had upheld the
right of congressional committees to investigate Communist infiltra-
tion of the universities"13 and of basic Southern industries'14 and had
refused an invitation to hold that a congressional committee could
not investigate alleged Communist infiltration of the press.1 Finally,
in Uphaus v. Wyman, 10 it had upheld Uphaus' conviction for con-
tempt for refusing to produce lists with the names of all persons who
had been guests at a camp maintained in New Hampshire by World
Fellowship, Inc. Uphaus was the Executive Director of World Fellow-
ship, Inc.; and Wyman, the Attorney General of New Hampshire, had
been constituted a one-man legislative investigating committee by a
joint resolution of the New Hampshire Legislature. The record devel-
oped before Wyman contained testimony that Uphaus had partici-
pated in "Communist front" activities and that nineteen speakers
invited to speak at World Fellowship had either been members of the
Communist Party or had been affiliated with it or with organizations
listed in the United States Attorney General's list of subversive or
Communist-controlled organizations.
Against this background, it is difficult to understand how the Court
could reverse Gibson's conviction without overruling at least some of
the prior cases. And yet this is what the Court did. In an opinion
written by Justice Goldberg, it stated that the "thrust of the demands
on the petitioner" was that he disclose whether certain persons were
113. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
114. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S.
431 (1961).
115. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
116. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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members of the N.A.A.C.P., a "concededly legitimate and non-sub-
versive organization."' 17 It then held that there was "no semblance"
of a sufficient connection between the N.A.A.C.P. and subversive ac-
tivities. 18 This lack of connection, the Court declared, distinguished
Gibson's case from that of Uphaus.n O One might point out in rebuttal,
as did Justice Harlan in his dissent,' 0 that the Court had upheld a
conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act in which
part of the Government's evidence included the Communist Party's
desire to win the support of the Negro population of the South for
its program of violent revolution.'-" The Court might nevertheless
have found a possible distinction between the Gibson and Uphaus
cases if there were some basis for finding that, unlike the N.A.A.C.P.,
World Fellowship, Inc. was a subversive organization. But nothing in
the record would permit that conclusion: World Fellowship was not
even on the discredited United States Attorney General's list. With
such evidence, the distinction would be plausible, and the decision
reversing Gibson's conviction without overruling Uphaus would there-
fore have been proper. Without such evidence, whatever the "proper"
reach of legislative investigating committees or the "true" rule of con-
stitutional law, the asserted distinction totally fails and the decision is
improper. Indeed, Gibson's conviction should have been easier to sup-
port because he was not asked to turn over the lists but only to refresh
his recollection by examining them. - -2
117. 372 US. 548.
118. Id. at 550.
119. Id. In a footnote, id. at 556, n.7, the Court cited Sweezey v. New Hampshire. 354
U.S. 234 (1957), in support of its decision. But Sweezy antedated all the cases cited above
and was a case in which petitioner had already been asked whether he was a member of
the Communist Party and whether he advocated the violent overthrow of the Government
and had answered both questions in the negative. The questions he refused to answer
concerned his personal beliefs, the contents of a lecture delivered to a humanities course
delivered at the University of New Hampshire, and the membership of his wife and others
in the Progressive Party of America. The Court held, with two justices dissnting, that
these questions were not pertinent to an investigation of subversion. There wms no "opinion
of the Court:' According to Justice Goldberg in Gibson, 372 U.S. at 556, n.7, Sweezy's case
involved more of a connection with subversive activities than Gibson's, a position which
I find difficult to accept.
120. Id. at 579-80.
121. Scales v. United States, 367 US. 203, 244-57 (1961).
122. The Florida state courts had already ruled, in a prior proceeding, that petitioner
could not be compelled to produce the list, but could only be asked to refresh his mem-
ory. 372 U.S. at 540-41. This alone would make somewhat inapposite the reliance by the
Court in Gibson on the fact that it had said in Uphaus that as to the "lodgers," the
operators of the camps were required to maintain a register open to inspection by police
officers. 360 U.S. at 80. In Gibson Justice Goldberg interpreted the requirement to mean
that the "disputed list was already a matter of public record." 372 US. at 550. The con-
clusion embodies a factual error as well, for the court in Uphats noted that "the lists
sought were more extensive than those required by the statute," although "most of the
names were recorded pursuant to it." 360 US. at 80, n.7. See also id. at 81; id. at 97, n.7
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The approach toward precedent exhibited by the Court in Gibson
was repeated in United States v. Brown,'123 where the Court struck
down, as a Bill of Attainder, a statute making it illegal for someone
who had been a member of the Communist Party within the previous
five years to be an officer of a labor union. In presenting its case, the
Government had proceeded on the basis that, whatever the "true"
definition of a Bill of Attainder, the Brown case was controlled by
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System V. Agnew, 124 in
which a statute making it illegal for a person engaged in the "under-
writing ... of securities" to serve as a director of a member bank of
the Federal Reserve System was upheld over the challenge that it was
a Bill of Attainder. While the two cases could have been distinguished
on several other possible grounds, 25 the main apparent basis on which
the Court distinguished them was that "communist" and "person
likely to cause political strikes" were not synonymous, whereas "em-
ployee of underwriting house" was synonymous with "person likely
unduly to influence the investment policy of a bank."'2 0 One would
like to have seen some evidence demonstrating that a communist was
less likely to cause political strikes than an underwriter unduly to
influence the investment policies of banks. Without further empirical
evidence, the distinction offends common sense.
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 2 7 is a final example
showing that the significant difference test provides sufficiently ob-
jective criteria of the correctness of judicial decisions to permit us to
say that the process is, in a meaningful sense, objective. Unlike the
previous cases, this case involved economic regulation and raised only
a question of statutory construction with no constitutional over-tones.
The decision turned on the construction of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act which, prior to 1950, read as follows:
(dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan). Is it possible, therefore, that Justice Goldberg was
suggesting that, if the N.A.A.C.P. were required to maintain a list of members by statute,
he would have been governed by Uphaus? A large measure of skepticism on this point
would appear justified.
123. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
124. 329 U.S. 441 (1947). -
125. For example, the statute involved in Brown, like the historical Bill of Attainder
and unlike the statute involved in Agnew, was aimed at political conduct. Moreover, under
the statute involved in Agnew, the Federal Reserve Board could grant individual exemp-
tions, while no such exemption was possible under the statute involved in Brown. Although
it noted this difference, the Court expressly declined to hold that the possibility of 1ni.
vidual exemption made the statute constitutional in one case and unconstitutional in the
other. 381 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1965).
126. Id.
127. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen com-
petition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such com-
merce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly
of any line of commerce. ' -8
An earlier case had construed the section not to cover acquisitions of
assets. Then, in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC,"' a
divided Court held that a merger or consolidation of two manufac-
turing corporations, when followed by the combination of their
assets, was also not an acquisition of stock but merely an acquisition of
assets and was thus not covered by the Act. The Federal Trade Com-
mission accordingly had no power, after the transfer of the assets, to
order the resulting corporation to divest itself of any of the acquired
assets.' 30
In 1950, Section 7 of the Clayton Act was amended to read, insofar
as pertinent, as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly. (Emphasis supplied.)
1 31
The Federal Trade Commission Act expressly provides that banks are
not corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the F.T.C.-2  Relying
on this provision, the Philadelphia National Bank and the Girard
Trust Corn Exchange Bank of Philadelphia decided to merge by con-
solidating assets in a new corporation. The Comptroller of the Cur-
128. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, c. 523; 7, 38 Stat. 731-32.
129. 291 U.S. 587 (1934). See also the three cases decided sub non,. FTC v. Western Meat
Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). ',-
130. The House Report accompanying the 1950 Clayton Act amendments described
Arrow-Hart as holding
that if an acquiring corporation secured title to the physical assets of a corporation
whose stock it had acquired before the Federal Trade Commission issues its final order.
the Commission lacks power to direct divestiture of the physical assets...
H.R. RE,. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949).
131. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964)).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 45a(6) (1964).
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rency approved the plan, stating in his annual report to the Congress
that, although the scheme would have an unfavorable effect on com-
petition, the consolidated bank would better serve the needs of the
community. 3 3 The United States sued to enjoin the proposed merger,
alleging that it violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7
of the Clayton Act. The major focus at the trial was on the Sherman
Act issue. The district court rendered judgment for the defendants,
and the United States appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and
held that the proposed merger was unlawful under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
The Court produced many reasons for its conclusions that the pro-
posed merger was undesirable, but it did not hold that the Arrow-Hart
Court misinterpreted Section 7. This holding would have been pos-
sible, although the relative antiquity of the case and the acquiescence
of Congress in it would have made such a course very awkward. Nor
did the Court attempt to show that Arrow-Hart had been misunder-
stood by Congress and the bar. Instead, it held that the addition of a
clause-
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets [of another corporation]
-which admittedly did not apply to banks changed the meaning of
the first clause-
[n]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
of another corporation,
-which had not been amended at all. Thus it concluded that the
Arrow-Hart case was no longer applicable. This astounding reason-
ing must have surprised the Government as much as anyone else
because even as late as 1957-seven years after the amendment of the
Clayton Act-the Department of Justice concluded that it had no
jurisdiction to challenge bank mergers under the Clayton ActY" Un-
doubtedly, it was for this reason that the Government and the de-
fendants in Philadelphia National Bank devoted almost all of their
argument before the Court to the Sherman Act.135 In terms of the
133. Cf. COMP'T. OF THE CURRENCY, 99,T ANN. REP'T 18 (1961).
134. The position of the Justice Department is stated in the materials quoted by Justice
Harlan in his dissent. 374 U.S. at 377-78.
135. Only ten out of eighty pages of argument in the Government briefs were devoted
to the Clayton Act issue.
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proposed model, the Court's disposition of the case amounts to a
decision that the amendment of a statute by the addition of a provi-
sion expressly not applicable to the parties in the instant case creates
a significant difference between the instant case and a prior case. Ap-
preciable research devoted to discovering cases in which a similar
technique of statutory interpretation was used has uncovered few even
moderately similar instances and none in which the reasoning is so
dearly implausible.13
D. Additional Remarks
It must be stressed that, under the model that we have constructed,
a court may not decide any two cases differently unless it can demon-
strate a plausibly significant difference between the cases. The fact
that different results in different cases could have been adequately
justified is no answer to a charge that the decision was improper, if the
court itself was unable to supply the necessary justification.13T This
is not so much because courts, particularly the Supreme Court, must
give guidance to future litigants and to inferior courts, but because
our criteria of fairness and objectivity empower a court to decide only
these cases whose decision it can justify.
136. Two analogous cases deserve some attention. In United States v. Hutcheson. 312U.S. 219 (1941), the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).by expanding the scope of union immunity from injunctive relief, had expanded the scopeof exemption from criminal prosecution accorded unions and their officers by Section 20of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964). Justice Roberts and Chief justice Hughes dis.sented, arguing that Congress meant Norris-LaGuardia to affect only the equity powers of
the federal courts. Hutcheson is cearly distinguishable from Philadelphia ,Nat'! Bank. Itis not implausible to argue that since Congress combined original immunity with equitableremedy under the same section of the Clayton Act, it intended subsequent enlargements
of the equitable remedy exemption to expand the scope of criminal immunity as well.A further example is Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934). Prior to \ew
York's adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, a seller could sue a defaulting buyer for theprice of the goods not only where title had passed, but also where there was only anexecutory contract to sell provided that, in the latter case, the seller made an appropriate
tender. The Sales Act retained this remedy where title had passed, but provided that where
there was only an executory contract to sell, the seller could only sue for damages. How-
ever, the Sales Act did not apply to sales of securities. In Agar, a stockbroker was suing acustomer who, under an executory contract to buy stock, refused to accept the stock cer-
tificates when they were tendered to him. The Court of Appeals held that a change in thelaw regarding tangible property justified a change in that regarding intangible property.
Agar is even more easily distinguished from Philadelphia Nat'l Bank than is Hutcheson.
Since the prior doctrine under review in Agar was a common law doctrine, the court could
properly make even a drastic modification of the law as to stocks and bonds in the light
of legislation covering tangible goods. Indeed, it would be foolish to ignore statutes as veryproper and useful sources of public policy and of analogies in the judicial decision-making
process. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common.Law Orbits, 18 CM. U. L. REv. 401
(1968).
137. In Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959), Professor Pollak attempts to supply rationales to meet criticismof the school segregation and restrictive covenant cases. Under the model, such com-
mentary cannot add to the objectivity of past decisions.
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While the model we have constructed requires a legal system in
which past cases are not lightly overruled, the model does not require
that a rigid system of stare decisis prevail. Nevertheless, although the
model does permit the overruling of past cases-that is, the removal
of cases from the body of case law which controls courts unless they
can justify new decisions by finding significant differences-it requires
that precedents be overruled only in certain ways. It requires that,
when the validity of a particular precedent is questioned, the prece-
dent cannot be looked at in a vacuum but must be examined in the
context of the entire body of the law. Thus Case X, which held that
a go-kart is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the road tax, may be
considered indirectly overruled by a subsequent decision in Case Y
that a farm tractor is a motor vehicle for such purposes-i.e., that
for purposes of the statute there was no significant difference between
a farm tractor and the paradigm case, the family motor car. Such 
a
conclusion can be drawn if, but only if, one is also willing to maintain
that there is no significant difference between a go-kart and a farm
tractor for purposes of the statute. If there are significant differences,
then the decision of Case Y is not a sufficient basis for overruling
Case X or for treating Case X as overruled.
Under the model one can also overrule Case X directly through
the decision of another go-kart case, Case Z, but only if one can
demonstrate that the significant difference between a go-kart and the
family automobile put forth in Case X does not in fact obtain. One
could do this by pointing to some overlooked legislative history mak-
ing clear that the distinction is not one that should be recognized or
by showing that the factual premises of the distinction are not sound.
One might show that the legislature considered and denied an express
statutory exemption for go-karts or for analogous vehicles like formula-
one racing cars. Alternatively, one might show that the court's assump-
tion in Case X that go-karts rarely travel on public highways was
factually incorrect. Unless one of these showings can be made, however,
Case X cannot be overruled and must be taken into account in the
decision of future cases. In a like manner a case involving a matter of
common law can be overruled if it is no longer significantly different
from other cases in which a conflicting result was reached or if its
factual assumptions are subsequently proved incorrect.
188
138. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court did not attempt the difficult
task of distinguishing the facts before it from those in Cicenia 
v. La~ay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958). The Escobedo Court distinguished Cicenia on the ground that it was 
decided in
reliance upon Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), a case in some important 
respects
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It should finally be mentioned that, in point of fact, the method of
reasoning described in this article is the predominant method of argu-
ment in many areas of the law. Under a rule-oriented method of
reasoning, the judicial application of vague notions like "negligence"
and "recklessness" would often appear completely arbitrary; yet be-
cause of the many decided cases involving such concepts, they are
sometimes easier to apply than even a seemingly precise statute.133
Therefore, while the model is in many respects a great departure from
the way courts say they decide cases, it does not represent so great a
departure from the way courts in fact decide them.
V. Conclusion
The search for objectivity in the law is undoubtedly motivated by
the desire to justify the great powers that courts are granted and to
explain why the public should have confidence in the courts' proper
performance of their function: without such justifications and ex-
planations, the judicial system is merely a vehicle for the application
of public power. 140 It is our contention that we have supplied a model
of legal argument that permits one to make a limited claim of objec-
tivity for judicial decision-making, a claim that is both meaningful
and useful. In deciding new cases in accordance with the model,
courts inevitably must and do legislate, but they can do so only in a
restricted and stylized manner. In many ways our present legal system
approaches this model; if it wishes to lay the strongest claim to ob-
jectivity that can be made, it will have to embrace the model com-
pletely. Naturally, accepting the model entails recognizing that there
are certain things that a court cannot do, whether in constitutional
law or in the creation of new "common law." One cannot choose to
be objective and not objective at the same time. To be objective
means to accept limitations upon what one can do. To act objectively
is not merely to act in a manner whereby one convinces himself that
he has acted objectively, but to operate in a manner that will con-
vince others-particularly unsympathetic others-that one has. In this
regard, legislatures must not make the task of the courts more difficult
by saddling them with broad statutes that cover large, important areas
distinguishable from Escobedo. See 378 US. at 491-92. Under the model of legal argument
that has been presented in this article, the Court could not properly employ this artifice
to avoid the necessity of distinguishing Cicenia.
139. Cf. Christie, supra note 34, at 893-910.
140. See L. HAND, TnE Bnt.L o" Rscsrrs 78 (1958).
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of social and economic activity and yet give the courts very little
guidance as to their scope and application.'
4 '
One might object that the courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
have a constitutional role to play which requires that they legislate
and make policy in addition to deciding legal disputes '
4 2 This may be
so, and yet it is not unreasonable to believe that the Court was given
its great constitutional role not in the hope that political decisions
could be subsumed under the rubric "law," nor in the belief that
autocratic decision alone could hold the country together in the face
of divisive controversy, but in the expectation that the Court qua
court could bring something to the resolution of difficult issues. As-
suming, for the moment, however, that no reconciliation between the
Court's legislative and judicial functions can be effected and granting
that the Court must perform a basically legislative function, we will be
obliged to conclude that there is no objectivity in constitutional ad-
judication: one can only hope for wisdom, compassion, and common-
sense. One might nevertheless urge that, in applying its constitutional
choices as opposed to making them initially, the Court should follow
the proposed model of legal argument. Such a course would spare the
Court the criticism of those who are unwilling to recognize its dual
role. One might further urge that the Court not carry into the arena
of nonconstitutional litigation-where it exercises a judicial function
-habits and methods developed in dealing with constitutional ques-
tions.
141. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964) is such a statute. A judge still active on
the federal bench has suggested, however, that he enjoys large antitrust cases because they
are far more exciting to try than are "run of the mill" cases. C. WYZANSKI, WIIRAs-
JUDGE'S PREMXISES 6 (1965).
Many commentators have suggested that the Court should have rejected the broad dele.
gation of authority that it was granted over labor relations. See Bickel & Wellington, supra
note 1; Wellington 9- Albert, supra note 90. Cf. Peck, supra note 2. It has been suggested
that delegation of power without sufficient guidelines has made a farce of quasi-judicial
proceedings before the F.C.C. Harwood, $20 Million Eggs from Blind Goose Called FCC,
Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1967, § B (Outlook), at 1, col. 1. One response to broad dele-
gation is the construction of simplistic, per se formulas, which diminish the amount of
judicial discretion. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); cf.
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
142. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLTICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 1-49, 328-33 (1964);
Wells & Grossman, The Concept of Judicial Policy-Making, A Critique, 15 J. Pun. LAW
286 (1966); cf. A. MASON & W. BFANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY 8805-320
(1968). For a lengthy comment on Shapiro, see Deutsch, supra note 9.
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